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Abstract: ICT products are often interdependent and in
some cases indispensably work together. Firms may thus
compete on different market levels pursuing different busi-
ness models to sponsor their proprietary technologies and
to maintain market share for their products and services.
Interoperability of products is a crucial factor for market
success and firms evermore have to coordinate and set
standards. These standardized technologies are in some
cases protected by patents. Standard essential patents
claim an invention that must be used by any company to
complywith a technical standard. They are subject to a new
anddifferent legal frameworkwhichgoes beyond the rights
of regular patent law. This may influence incentives to
develop and specify ICT standards, incentives to invest in
R&D or incentives to file patents. Yet, the inclusion of
intellectual property in standards, and the strategic beha-
vior of its owners, can have far-reaching consequences for
market structure, market entry, and sustained technical
progress and innovation. This article discusses current le-
gal and economic issues on the interplay of patents and
standards and provides empirical insides on licensing, pa-
tenting and coordination.
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1 Technology Standards and the
Interplay with IPR
In the past years discussions about the interplay of IPR
(intellectual property rights) and technological standards
have been increasing. On the one hand this is due to the
growing importance of technological standards in our in-
terconnected information and communication society,
where interoperability and common agreement on a tech-
nology is crucial to unlock innovation [8]. On the other
hand recent problems of IPR and standards such as patent
hold-up1, patent ambush2 or royalty stacking3 behavior
have caused expensive litigation cases and raised ques-
tions in patent law, contract law and especially in anti-
trust law ([24]; [14]; [19]). In the field of ICT (Information
and Communication Technology), standards frame a
large number of innovative technologies (WiFi, LTE,
RFID, DVD, Bluetooth etc.). The need for interoperability
comes with an increasing sophistication of technology
standards. In this context, standard setting is much more
demanding in terms of R&D (research and development),
representing a key strategic stake for companies that may
increase the value of their patented technology by having
it approved as part of an industry-wide standard. Patents
that would necessarily be infringed by any implementa-
tion or adoption of a standard are called standard essen-
tial patents [26].
Although theneed for interoperability is not recent, the
last two decades have seen standard setting in ICT evolve
from mere coordination of common specifications to the
joint development of complex technology platforms [2]. As
a consequence, the number of patents infringed by stan-
dards has been increasing dramatically over the same peri-
od [26], raising concerns about the rising cost of royalties
for users of some ICT standards [25]. Besides the growing
technical sophistication of standards, this trend is due to a
use of patents for a broader set of strategic motives [7] and
more aggressive patenting strategies of firms [6] who seek
to derive revenue from their standard essential patents.
Empirical evidence indeed suggests that standard essential
patents are more valuable than other patents [22] and that
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1 Patent hold-up is a situation in which a patent holder commits on
licensing standard essential patents to FRAND terms, a standard
developing organization relies on that promise and uses the patented
technology to set a standard, but the patent holder subsequently
breaches that promise and denies to license or demands higher
license fees than promised.
2 A patent ambush occurs when a patent holder withholds informa-
tion on standard essentiality during the participation in standard
setting activities and subsequently asserts that the unknown essential
patent is infringed by use of the standard as adopted.
3 Royalty stacking refers to situations in which a single standard
potentially infringes on many patents. The standard adopter thus has
to pay royalties to all patent holders resulting in a cumulative license
like a stack of royalties.
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firms which own a large share of essential patents also
enjoy a strong position in the market for standard-compli-
ant products [5]. Furthermore recent empirical research has
provided evidence that standard essential patents may di-
rectly increase a company’s financial returns [21].
Especially in the context of patent thickets4, empirical
studies evidence an excessive patent filing behavior for
certain technologies. The assumption is that companies
try to protect their inventions with a preferably high num-
ber of patents. The increasing complexity of patent files
may cause coordination problems and in some cases even
leads to litigation [25].
2 Standards Setting for ICT and
Antitrust Concerns
Technological standards often shape widely used technol-
ogies. UMTS and LTE ensure communication of mobile
phones and smart phones. The Wi-Fi standard provides a
wireless connection to local internet hosts. CDs and DVDs
guarantee that decoders or players read discs and project
movies onto TV screens and the MP3 standards allows us
to listen to high quality music in compressed data for-
mats. Most consumers are not aware that these standards
incorporate hundreds of patents from multiple compa-
nies. Only in recent years famous litigation cases (Qual-
comm v. Broadcom; Infineon v. Rambus; IP COM v. Nokia;
Apple v. Samsung; etc.) drew attention to the often com-
plex legal questions concerning standard setting and the
role of IPR. Authorities of competition policy are con-
cerned with standardization practices in terms of the
direct coordination among competing companies that
work together on a commonly agreed technology. One
main antitrust issue is the open participation and appro-
priate technology selection [28] which addresses the legal
necessity of the participation of Standard Setting Organi-
zations (SSOs). Even though standard setting is very
costly in terms of personnel and travel expenses [22] and
thus usually only attracts big or medium sized firms,
formal standards organizations are by law and policy
open to all interested parties.5 Another antitrust concern
is the appropriate standard selection. Since antitrust
authorities themselves often lack technical expertise, this
is difficult to evaluate. One can argue though, that the
appropriate standard is selected when all affected stake-
holders in the market agree to the standard [28]. The
selection procedures of standard proposals always re-
quest consensus decisions, while majority voting is usual-
ly not accepted.6 However, some industry standards may
not be set by formal standard organizations but by rather
informal fora and consortia.7 Standards consortia may
have differing policies and standardization procedures,
which are less inclusive in terms of membership and
require less consensus in terms of decision making [1].
The most discussed issue that became relevant for
antitrust questions in the last decades is the role of patents
that are essential to a standard. The fear is that essential
patents may leverage market power and lead to exclusive
effects [19]. Whereas patents are actually intended to allow
their owners to exclude others from using the protected
invention, the main objective of standards is to encourage
the spread and wide implementation of the standardized
technology [16]. Manufacturers that create products are not
able to bypass standards or invent around standardized
technologies, since standards shape the interface to con-
nect, communicate or work on or with other products and
platforms. A smart phone without UMTS or LTE adoption,
for example, would not be able to connect to any network.
A patent that blocks a standard could thus also block a
whole technology or evenwhole industries [17]. This appar-
ent conflict is resolved by licensing. Standardization parti-
cipants are expected to allow others the use of their tech-
nology, but they can demand adequate royalties. SSOs
often mandatorily require firms participating in standard
setting to disclose any patent that might turn out to be
essential for the standard in question. Furthermore holders
of such patents have to submit a declaration whether they
accept to commit to fair, reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory terms of licensing for these patents (FRAND commit-
ments). If a firm discloses a patent and refuses to commit to
such licensing terms, the SSO will usually set the standard
excluding the IPR protected technology. In a recent survey
companies state that securing freedom to operate andmar-
ket entry are the most important reasons for owning stan-
dard essential patents (figure 1).
Even though standardization may be accompanied by
complex licensingagreements, the rules for the licensing of
4 Patent thickets refer to a situation in which a large number of patent
claims overlap like a dense web.
5 Informal standards consortia sometimes request high member fees
or only allow participation by invitation. However these practices to
not apply for international standards organizations such as ISO, IEC,
CEN, ITU, ETSI or IEEE.
6 Find details in the ISO guidelines under http://www.iso.org/iso/
guidance_liaison-organizations.pdf.
7 Standards consortia are rather informal groups of entities with the
goal of setting standards or agreeing on a common specification. Well
known standards consortia are theW3C or the IETF.
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Figure 1: Reasons why companies want to own standard essential patents.8
patents essential for a commonly agreed standard are
often unclear and can be subject to complex discussions.
Especially companies that do not own standard essential
patents fear that these patents may slow down standardi-
zation, block consensus decision-making and decrease
standard adoption (figure 2). Nevertheless, FRAND com-
mitments are commonly seen as an important instrument
to curb abusive strategies. Moreover, antitrust authorities
have referred to FRAND commitments as a remedy to the
potential competitive risks of standardization ([15]; [11];
[27]; [23]).
3 FRAND Commitments and
Antitrust Policy
Antitrust law interprets the licensing of essential patents as
a market of its own. A company that owns an essential
patent holds a dominant position in this market. The stan-
dard adopter has the right to get a license under FRAND
terms, which can be raised as a defense in infringement
cases. An important body of academic research interprets
FRAND commitments as restricting themaximumheight of
royalty requests and devotes little attention to examining
whether pricing is non-discriminatory among the licensees.
This general line of interpretation is not really acceptable
for antitrust scholars, since competition policy, especially
if dealingwith patents, should not aimat restricting profits,
but at guaranteeing a level playing field for competition [4].
8 Blind et al.,EU Commission, 2011, S. 1–213, http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/european-standards/files/standards_policy/ipr-
workshop/ipr_study_final_report_en.pdf
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Figure 2: How standard essential patentsmay affect standard setting.9
Diverging interpretations of FRAND commitments are a
frequent source of conflict. Very important cases of alleged
breach of FRAND commitments have motivated debates
intended to give a concretemeaning especially to the terms
“fair” and “reasonable”. The question is howmuch weight
the patented technology has compared to other parts that
frame the standard or product. Especially when several
companies hold patents for a specific standard and the
licensing contracts are not transparent, the problem of
doublemarginalizationmay arise. In these situations every
patentee would overestimate the value of its own essential
IPR and the costs of a cumulative license would not be
“fair” and “reasonable” anymore [18]. As shown in figure 3,
royalties may indeed result in remarkable percentages,
increasing in ratesby standardgeneration.
Many complaints about anticompetitive effects of
standardization and cases of antitrust litigation focus on
the structure of pricing, i.e. on claims that specific licen-
sing schemes put some licensees at a competitive disad-
vantage with respect to their direct competitors. In several
industries, especially in the consumer electronics and mo-
bile telephony sectors, respectively, holders of essential
patents compete on the production market against produ-
cers who do not hold patents. The argument is that patent
holders profit from standardization using cross licensing
or joined licensing schemes to exclude their downstream
market competitors ([15]; [23]).
4 Patent Pools, Joint Licensing
Antitrust authorities have in some cases softened their
approach to far-reaching business coordination among
patent owners inside and outside standard setting bodies.
The favorable business reviews for the MPEGLA patent
pool by the US Department of Justice and the EC in 1997 set
an example for joint licensing models. Most negotiations
on joint licensing take place outside standard setting
bodies several years after the release of the standard.
While SSO bylaws require a disclosure of any essential
IPR, SSOs are not responsible for these practices being
followed correctly. However, during the last years stan-
dard setting bodies no longer refrain from dealing actively
with intellectual property issues.10 For example the Eur-
9 Blind et al, EU Commission, 2011, S. 1–213, http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/european-standards/files/standards_policy/ipr-
workshop/ipr_study_final_report_en.pdf.
10 The US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
announced in their 2007 Report, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellec-
tual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, that
they will review joint negotiation policies at standard setting bodies
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Figure 3: How standard essential patentsmay affect standard setting.11
Figure 4: active patent pools, pool members and standard essential patent files over time12
opean Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) project of the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
has a policy of actively promoting the creation of patent
pools, at least one of which is managed by ETSI itself. The
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has
signed a general partnership agreement with the patent
pool manager Via Licensing that should help foster rapid
and smooth patent pool creation [13]. Figure 4 shows the
increasing number of standard related patent pools and
increasing pool memberships.
5 Ex-Ante Licensing
Another source of problems for competition policy is that
standards are set before the precise licensing terms for
essential patents are disclosed. An often-discussed solu-
tion would be that standard setting participants disclose
explicit commitments before a standard is released. Since
FRAND is not precise enough on the exact licensing
under a rule of reason, rather than as per se illegal. Under: http://
www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationand-
Competitionrpt0704.pdf
11 Blind et al.,EU Commission, 2011, S. 1–213, http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/european-standards/files/standards_policy/ipr-
workshop/ipr_study_final_report_en.pdf.
12 [3], the data was provided by IPlytics GmbH (www.iplytics.com).
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amount, licensees fear excessive royalties after a standard
is widely accepted in the industry. Especially in the field of
ICT, companies and organizations urge to implement ex
ante commitments of licensing terms, meaning that com-
panies have to explicitly state their licensing conditions
before the standard is set. This early commitment would
increase the transparency of licensing and royalty stacking
and hold-up strategies [12]. There is a strong asymmetry
between the costs of choosing a different standard propo-
sal and not implementing a generally accepted market
standard [28].
6 Discussion
The current discussions show that the interplay between
patents and standards still causes legal uncertainties for
many companies. On the one hand, products must imple-
ment certain standards so that innovative solutions work
together as part of a cross-system interoperability. On the
other hand, it is often unclear for manufacturers who holds
patents relevant for a standard and which royalties will be
claimed. Especially for small and medium-sized enter-
prises or new market entrants it is often not transparent
which patents are infringed when using standardized tech-
nologies. Furthermore, the growing trade of these patents
also increases the complexity of identifying possible licen-
sors [10]. These uncertainties increase the risk of invest-
ment in research and development activities and in the
long term could reduce innovation investments of some
manufacturers. There is also the growing fear of excessive
royalties paid to non-manufacturing companies that hold
patents and enforce them aggressively [20]. However,
there are first initiatives to identify all patents relevant for
technology standards, with the aim of creating more trans-
parency in themarket.13
Nevertheless, current disputes show that also patent
holders have concerns regarding the interaction between
patents and standards. If a patent is declared essential for
a certain standard, the right to impose an injunction for
infringement of these patents is limited in some cases.
These are cases in which a licensee agrees to enter a licen-
sing negotiation with the patent holder. However, licen-
sees may delay the actual license payments over several
years of negotiations, or even start litigation on invalidity.
Patent holders complain that the constraint on temporary
injunctions takes away the leverage against non-paying
patent infringers that are delaying the payment. This beha-
vior is often referred to as reversed hold-up. On the other
hand licensees argue that the possibility to impose an
injunction could increase royalties even in the absence of
a court decision. This is especially true when an injunction
is used to thread patent infringers to speed up the payment
of royalty fees. These fees would then be subject to an
anticompetitive price [9].
To decrease legal uncertainty for standard adopters in
the future, there is a need to further clarify FRAND statutes
of the respective standards organizations. It appears, how-
ever, that they avoid such legal issues. Standards organi-
zations state to merely provide a platform on which the
parties concerned can resolve any discrepancies regarding
the licensing of standard essential patents. Another aim
should be a harmonization between the statutes of the
respective standards organizations. Throughout the last
years commercial entities and standards organizations
have also initiated alternative patent licensing methods
such as ex-ante royalty caps or royalty-free arrangements.
Here, the DVB Forum, the Bluetooth Special Interest Group
and the W3C consortium are examples of new approaches
that regulate the licensing of standard essential patents.
There is also a tendency of large manufacturers like e.g.
Apple, Cisco, Google and Microsoft to state so-called uni-
lateral promises of a FRAND licensing to promote a trans-
parency and reduce legal uncertainty.
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